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abstract . The signing of the U.S. Constitution is traditionally understood as the closing 
act of the Constitutional Convention. This Note provides an alternative account, one that 
understands the Constitution’s signing as the opening act of the ratification campaign that 
followed in the Convention’s wake. To begin, the Note explains the signatures’ ambiguous form 
as the product of political maneuvering designed to win support for the Constitution during 
ratification. The Note then hypothesizes two ways in which the signatures may have helped to 
secure this support: (1) by highlighting pro-Constitution selling-points likely to resonate with 
the ratifying public; and (2) by limiting the ability of the signers to distance themselves from the 
Constitution once ratification battles had begun. Finally, the Note identifies a few respects in 
which this ratification-centered account of the Constitution’s signing may influence our modern-
day understanding of the document. 
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On September 17, 1787, the final day of the Constitutional Convention, 
North Carolina delegate Hugh Williamson made a proposal. The proposal did 
not concern any substantive provision of the Constitution, the final draft of 
which was all but complete, and it did not call for any additional orders of 
business for the day. Instead, Williamson’s proposal concerned the delegates’ 
plan to sign the Constitution. Speaking just hours before business concluded in 
Philadelphia, Williamson voiced his opposition to this plan, suggesting instead 
that “the signing should be confined to the letter accompanying the 
Constitution to Congress[] which might perhaps do nearly as well, and would 
be found satisfactory to some members who disliked the Constitution.”1 
There appear to be no further records of Williamson’s thinking on this 
matter, so we cannot know for sure what motivated his proposal. That 
said, Williamson could have advanced at least five arguments in favor of 
leaving the Constitution unsigned. 
The first argument—and the one that Williamson’s brief remarks gesture 
toward—relates to those delegates who harbored doubts about the 
Convention’s final product. In particular, Williamson could have argued that 
dissatisfied delegates would have fewer reservations about signing a cover 
letter than about signing the Constitution itself, because signatures on a cover 
letter, especially if accompanied by the right wording, were less likely to 
translate into an unqualified endorsement of the Convention’s work. Given the 
choice between a fully signed cover letter and a partially signed Constitution, 
Williamson appears to have preferred the former, and for good reason. The 
Constitution was soon to go before ratifying conventions across the country, 
and some expression of total unanimity among the Philadelphia delegates, even 
if vague, might well have looked better than a clearly nonunanimous 
expression on the face of the document submitted for review. 
Second, Williamson could have reminded his colleagues that the 
Constitution, if ratified, would belong not to the delegates at the 
Constitutional Convention, but to the people of the United States. As Article 
VII made clear, the document was to remain a mere proposed charter of 
governance until at least nine popularly elected state conventions had ratified 
it.2 And, as Article V made clear, the document, once ratified, could be changed 
 
1.  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 645 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
2.  U.S. CONST. art. VII. Even by June 21, 1788, when New Hampshire became the ninth state 
to ratify, the Constitution still existed only as law-to-be, and, as the Supreme Court would 
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freely by the action of a supermajority of state legislative bodies. Signing this 
document, Williamson could have argued, would take authorship credit away 
from “We the People,” the collective entity in whose name the Constitution 
spoke and whose assent alone could give it legal force.3 
Third, Williamson might have noted that, by signing the Constitution, the 
delegates ran the risk of putting the names of foreigners on the national 
founding charter. Article VII, after all, required only nine states to ratify the 
Constitution, so it was possible that the new nation would exclude as many as 
four of the states whose delegates’ names appeared on the document. Concerns 
about referencing states not in the union had already prompted the framers to 
revise an earlier version of the Preamble,4 and these concerns seem equally 
 
acknowledge thirty-one years later, this law-to-be did not come into force until the first 
Article I Congress convened in Philadelphia on March 4, 1789. See Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. 
(5 Wheat.) 420, 423 (1820) (holding that the Constitution’s Contract Clause did not apply to 
legislative acts done prior to the “first Wednesday in March, 1789”). But see Gary Lawson & 
Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (2001) 
(arguing that the Owings Court “grossly oversimplified the problem” and that “[d]ifferent 
clauses of the Constitution actually became effective at different points in time, and certain 
crucial provisions . . . took effect immediately upon completion of the ninth ratification in 
1788”). 
3.  Akhil Amar has argued that: 
The Preamble began the proposed Constitution; Article VII ended it. The 
Preamble said that Americans would “establish this Constitution”; Article VII said 
how we would “Establish[] this Constitution.” The Preamble said this deed would 
be done by “the People”; Article VII clarified that the people would act via 
specially elected “Conventions.” The Preamble invoked the people of “the United 
States”; Article VII defined what that phrase meant both before and after the act 
of constitution. The Preamble consisted of a single sentence; so did Article VII. 
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 29 (2005) (alteration and 
emphasis in original). While this claim is certainly true, it is also true that the conspicuous 
presence of the signatures beneath Article VII makes the Preamble/Article VII “bookend” 
relationship less apparent. 
4.  In its original form, the Preamble began with: “We, the people of the states of New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New 
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Georgia . . . .” 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 224 (photo. reprint 1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d 
ed. 1888) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]; see also 1 ROGER FOSTER, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, HISTORICAL AND JURIDICAL § 19, at 94-95 (1895) 
(arguing that this version of the preamble was discarded on account of the nine-state 
requirement of Article VII). 
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applicable to the signatures, especially in light of the delegates’ plan to sign on 
a state-by-state basis.5 
Fourth, Williamson could have pointed to tradition. None of the 
“constitutive” American documents with which he and his colleagues were 
familiar—including the Articles of Confederation and the eighteenth-century 
state constitutions—had ever been signed at such a preliminary stage in their 
legal development.6 These documents had taken on their signatures during, or 
well after, the time that they acquired legal force. The Constitution, in contrast, 
remained a mere proposal at the time of its signing and still faced many 
hurdles before it could become law. 
Finally, Williamson could have taken a long-term perspective, arguing that 
the signatures would historicize the Constitution. He might have expressed 
concern that the delegates’ names would overemphasize the document’s origins 
and thereby tempt future generations to perceive it as frozen in the past rather 
than adaptable to their time. He might have added that a listing of names 
would interrupt the flow from the main text of the document to its future 
amendments and that the nation would soon embrace far more states than the 
ones identified by the signatures. In short, a list of signatures entered in 1787 
might come to look ill fitting on a Constitution “intended to endure for ages to 
come.”7 
Rather than heed Williamson’s advice, the delegates at Philadelphia 
concluded business by affixing their names to the document over which 
they had spent the past four months laboring. Days later, when copies of 
the Constitution began to appear in newspapers around the country,8 
everyday Americans would find at its bottom a veritable “Who’s Who” of 
the nation’s political leaders—including such titans as Benjamin Franklin, 
 
5.  It would have been particularly appropriate for Williamson to make this point, as his home 
State of North Carolina would end up becoming such a foreign nation (and he himself a 
foreign signatory) during the first few months of the new nation’s existence. Cf. Lawson & 
Seidman, supra note 2 (exploring the transition period between the Constitution’s adoption 
and the subsequent ratifications of North Carolina and Rhode Island). Similarly, 
Williamson could have noted that Rhode Island, a state that had never bothered to send 
delegates to Philadelphia, might end up belonging to the United States, albeit without a 
constitutional signature acknowledging its inclusion.  
6.  For further elaboration of this point, see infra Section I.B. 
7.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
8.  See, e.g., PA. PACKET, & DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 19, 1787, reprinted in RICHARD B. 
BERNSTEIN WITH KYM S. RICE, ARE WE TO BE A NATION? THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 187-90 (1987). 
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Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Gouverneur Morris, James Wilson, 
and the soon-to-be first President, George Washington. 
This Note attempts to explain why, in spite of all the potential objections to 
the signing of the Constitution, the delegates at Philadelphia put their names 
to the document. Broadly speaking, there were two compelling reasons for 
signing the Constitution, both of which anticipated the fierce battle for 
ratification that would follow on the heels of the Constitutional Convention. 
First, the delegates’ signatures would function as a marketing device, 
highlighting important pro-Constitution selling points to the people who 
would ultimately determine its fate. Second, the signatures would function as a 
constraining device, preventing the Constitution’s signatories—all of whom 
carried considerable local influence—from publicly opposing the document 
once the ratification battles began. 
But this is only half of the signatures’ story. For, while the marketing and 
constraining functions help to explain the signatures’ presence on the face of 
the Constitution, they leave unanswered the question of what the delegates at 
Philadelphia intended to convey—and ultimately did convey—with their 
signatures. What, in other words, did the framers understand themselves to 
communicate when they put their names onto the Constitution and how were 
their signatures interpreted by those who encountered them during 
ratification? As it turns out, the answer to this question is by no means 
straightforward. Indeed, as this Note will show, the signatures were shrouded 
in ambiguity from the moment they took form, leading some to interpret them 
as mere attestations to the fact that the Convention adopted the Constitution 
and others to interpret them as endorsements of the Constitution itself. This 
ambiguity, moreover, resulted from design rather than accident, and it ended 
up increasing the effectiveness of the signatures’ ratification-related functions. 
The Note proceeds as follows: Part I provides historical context, including 
a description of the Constitution’s signing and a comparison of the 
Constitution’s signatures to those on similar documents already in existence in 
1787. Part II turns to the signatures’ ambiguity, analyzing the various 
interpretations that might have been given to the signing act—both by the 
signers themselves and by those who first confronted the signatures—and 
explaining how and why these various interpretations might have arisen. Part 
III then addresses the central question: What was the signatures’ purpose? 
Section III.A. shows that the signatures functioned as a marketing device, 
explaining the signatures’ role in underscoring the unanimity of affairs at 
Philadelphia, the prestige of the framers, and the momentousness of the choice 
the ratifiers had been called on to make. Section III.B. then demonstrates that 
the signatures also functioned as a constraining device, which effectively 
impeded signatories with reservations about the Constitution from later 
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opposing ratification. Finally, Part IV discusses some ways in which my 
historical discussion of the signatures might influence our contemporary 
understanding of the Constitution. 
i .  the signatures in historical context  
A. The Signing of the Constitution 
It is unclear whether, at the outset of the Convention, the delegates at 
Philadelphia expected that their final product would display their names. From 
Madison’s notes we know that at least one delegate, South Carolinian Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney, had acknowledged the possibility of signing by August 
22nd, less than a month before the signing actually occurred. Opposing a 
proposed clause that would ban the importation of slaves, General Pinckney 
“declared it to be his firm opinion that if himself & all his colleagues were to 
sign the Constitution [including such a clause] & use their personal influence, it 
would be of no avail towards obtaining the assent of their Constituents.”9 Also, 
by mid-September Elbridge Gerry had stated his intention to “withhold his 
name” from the Constitution, even though no one had yet moved to sign it.10 
The formal motion to sign came from Benjamin Franklin, the oldest 
delegate at Philadelphia.11 Franklin introduced his motion with one of the 
Convention’s better known speeches.12 (Too frail to speak at length, Franklin 
had fellow Pennsylvanian James Wilson read the speech on his behalf.)13 
Making reference to his age and experience, Franklin noted that “the older I 
grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and to pay more respect 
 
9.  2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 371 (emphasis added). 
10.  See id. at 632. 
11.  For a detailed account of Franklin’s participation in the Constitutional Convention, see 
WILLIAM G. CARR, THE OLDEST DELEGATE: FRANKLIN IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
(1990). Carr contests the conventional wisdom that Franklin’s role at Philadelphia was 
primarily ceremonial. He argues instead that Franklin was actively involved in shaping the 
document and generating consensus for its various provisions. 
12.  For a detailed analysis of Franklin’s speech, see Barbara B. Oberg, “Plain, Insinuating, 
Persuasive”: Benjamin Franklin’s Final Speech to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, in 
REAPPRAISING BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: A BICENTENNIAL PERSPECTIVE 175 (J.A. Leo Lemay ed., 
1993). 
13.  2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 641 (“Docr. Franklin rose with a speech in his hand, 
which he had reduced to writing for his own conveniency, and which Mr. Wilson  
read . . . .”). 
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to the judgment of others.”14 Then, acknowledging the extraordinary difficulty 
of the Convention’s task, he concluded that he and his fellow delegates had 
done excellent work: 
It . . . astonishes me, Sir, to find this system approaching so near to 
perfection as it does; and I think it will astonish our enemies, who are 
waiting with confidence to hear that our councils are confounded like 
those of the Builders of Babel; and that our States are on the point of 
separation, only to meet hereafter for the purpose of cutting one 
another’s throats. Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I 
expect no better, and because I am not sure, that it is not the best.15 
Having voiced approval for the content of the Constitution, Franklin reached 
the crux of his speech: 
Much of the strength & efficiency of any Government in procuring and 
securing happiness to the people, depends[] on the general opinion of 
the goodness of the Government, as well as of the wisdom and integrity 
of its Governors. I hope therefore that for our own sakes as a part of the 
people, and for the sake of posterity, we shall act heartily and 
unanimously in recommending this Constitution (if approved by 
Congress & confirmed by the Conventions) wherever our influence 
may extend, and turn our future thoughts & endeavors to the means of 
having it well administered.16 
He then moved that the delegates sign the Constitution.17 
Debate followed. Edmund Randolph of Virginia and Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts stated their intentions not to sign, highlighting a variety of 
objections to the document’s overall plan. Franklin responded by putting in a 
final plea for unanimity, and other delegates echoed his calls to set aside 
differences for the greater good.18 Eventually the motion to sign was put to a 
vote. Ten states voted to do so, none against, and one state, South Carolina, 
 
14.  Id. at 642. 
15.  Id. at 642-43. 
16.  Id. at 643. 
17.  Recalling Franklin’s speech, Maryland delegate James McHenry later wrote, “It was plain, 
insinuating persuasive—and in any event of the system guarded the Doctor’s fame.” Id. at 
649. 
18.  Id. at 644-49. 
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split on the motion.19 (Neither New York nor Rhode Island was eligible to vote 
because neither state had a quorum of delegates present at the time.) All 
individual delegates then in attendance—except for Randolph, Gerry, and 
Randolph’s fellow Virginian, George Mason—proceeded to sign the 
Constitution, which was then given to William Jackson, the Convention’s 
secretary, for delivery to Congress. 
All told, forty signatures made their way onto the document, with thirty-
nine of these signatures belonging to the Convention’s delegates and one 
belonging to Secretary Jackson. At the top of the list comes the name of George 
Washington, who signed both as “deputy from Virginia” and president of the 
Constitutional Convention. Below Washington’s name appear the signatures 
of the remaining delegates, grouped by states listed in geographic order from 
north to south. The signatures occupy two columns of the Constitution’s final 
page, with New Hampshire’s signatures placed at the top of the right column 
and Georgia’s concluding the roster in the bottom of the left column. Jackson’s 
name appears to the left-hand side of all of these names, introduced by the 
word “Attest.”20 
 
19.  Id. at 647. South Carolina’s delegation included Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and Pierce 
Butler, both of whom objected to the “equivocal form” of the Constitution’s signatures. See 
infra Section II.A. 
20.  This odd physical arrangement can best be explained as accidental. Presumably the signers 
began listing their names with the expectation that all thirty-nine would fit into one 
column. As it later became clear that this single column would not accommodate all the 
delegates’ names, they had to make the slightly awkward move of creating a second column 
to the left of the one already in place. See 2 JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787: A COMPREHENSIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING 721 (2005) 
(“By the time the delegates from New Hampshire through Pennsylvania had signed the 
document, the signatures reached the end of the page. Signatures from delegates from 
Delaware and from Georgia are thus recorded in another column to the left.”). 
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Two days later, the Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser became the first 
newspaper to publish the Constitution.21 Though the paper could not 
reproduce the handwritten names of the signers, it displayed typewritten 
versions in the same state-by-state form as on the Constitution’s concluding 
page.22 Similar versions of the signatures would soon crop up in many other 
major American newspapers. Thus, while the people could not see the framers’ 
signatures firsthand, they would become well aware of the Constitution’s 
signing. 
B. Precursors to the Constitution’s Signatures 
The U.S. Constitution was not the first document of its kind to bear 
signatures. By 1787, most states had passed constitutions of their own, and 
most of these constitutions displayed signatures in one form or another. 
Signatures also appeared on the face of the Articles of Confederation, the very 
document the Constitution was intended to replace. In short, the delegates 
could point to a number of historical precedents in support of their decision to 
sign.23 
To be sure, these precedents may remove some of the mystery from the 
Constitution’s signatures. Given that past American framers had signed past 
American charters, the signing of the Constitution may be seen, at least in part, 
as a reflexive nod to a well-established tradition. But, as I will argue in this 
Part, the historical connection between the Constitution’s signatures and those 
that were affixed to earlier documents is more tenuous than it might at first 
appear. A closer comparison reveals important differences—both formal and 
semantic—and these differences complicate any effort to characterize the 
Constitution’s signing as based primarily on instinct or adherence to historical 
practice. 
 
21.  See 2 VILE, supra note 20, at 559. 
22.  With two exceptions: first, the printer rearranged the two columns of the signatures, such 
that New Hampshire began the left column and Georgia ended the right column. Recall that 
things are flipped on the original Constitution: New Hampshire begins the right column 
and Georgia ends the left. Second, the printer replaced most of the abbreviations with fully 
spelled out words. Thus, “Wm. Blount” became “William Blount,” “J. Rutledge” became 
“John Rutledge,” each “Jr.” became “Junior,” and so on. PA. PACKET, & DAILY ADVERTISER, 
supra note 8. 
23.  The Declaration of Independence, of course, also displayed signatures, but it was not, at 
least explicitly, a constitutional document. As a result, I have omitted it from my discussion 
here. I will, however, have more to say about the Declaration’s signatures in Part III. See 
infra Section III.B. 
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1. Formal Differences 
There is a striking formal difference between the signatures on the federal 
Constitution and those on the early state constitutions: the Constitution 
contains a large number of signatures, while the state constitutions contained 
only a small number of signatures, if any at all. Indeed, during the spate of 
constitution-making in the early years of the Revolution, not one state saw fit 
to include more than three signatures on its founding charter.24 Those states 
that did opt for signatures included the name of key presiding officers 
(particularly, the heads of legislative bodies) and sometimes the additional 
signature of a secretary.25 In no state, however, were signatures affixed by all 
 
24.  By 1787, eleven of the thirteen states had full-fledged constitutions. (Connecticut and Rhode 
Island had abstained from constitution-making during the Revolutionary period and had 
instead opted to work necessary changes into their preexisting royal charters.) For a brief 
summary of the various state constitutions that sprang into existence during the late 
eighteenth century, see WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: 
REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE 
REVOLUTIONARY ERA 5-6 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 1980); and Robert F. 
Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania’s Radical 1776 
Constitution and Its Influences on American Constitutionalism, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 541, 542-48 
(1989), which summarizes the decade of state constitution-making prior to the 
Constitutional Convention. For a more detailed treatment of Connecticut’s and Rhode 
Island’s decisions to rework their charters in lieu of adopting constitutions, see ADAMS, 
supra, at 66-68; Charter of Conn. (April 23, 1662), reprinted in 1 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, 
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 
OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 529-36 (1909); and Charter of R.I. (July 8, 1663), reprinted in 6 THORPE, 
supra, at 3211-22.  
25.  Of the eleven state constitutions in force at the time of the Constitutional Convention, two 
constitutions (Georgia and Virginia) bore no signatures at all. See GA. CONST. of 1777, 
reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 24, at 777-85; VA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 7 THORPE, 
supra note 24, at 3812-19. New Hampshire had adopted a provisional constitution in 1776 
that bore no signatures, N.H. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 24, at 2451-
53, but this constitution was replaced in 1784 by a constitution with two signatures at the 
bottom, N.H. CONST. of 1784, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 24, at 2453-70. Displaying 
one signature apiece (that of a presiding officer) were the constitutions of Maryland, MD. 
CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 24, at 1686-1701; New York, N.Y. CONST. 
of 1777, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 24, at 2623-38; and Pennsylvania, PA. CONST. of 
1776, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 24, at 3081-92. Three more constitutions (Delaware, 
New Jersey, and North Carolina) followed in a similar mold, although these constitutions 
added a secretary’s signature below each presiding officer’s. See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, 
reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 24, at 562-68; N.J. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 5 THORPE, 
supra note 24, at 2594-98; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 24, at 2787-
94. South Carolina’s Constitution displayed the signatures of the state president, the 
speaker of the legislative council, and the speaker of the general assembly, appearing as a 
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members of the legislative assemblies or other delegations that issued the 
founding document. 
The Constitution’s signatures also stand in contrast to the signatures on 
the Articles of Confederation. While these two sets of names did resemble each 
other in terms of numerosity,26 the Articles’ signatures differ from the 
Constitution’s signatures in an important temporal respect. The Constitution’s 
signing took place quickly, with all signers placing their names on the 
document during the afternoon of September 17, 1787. The Articles of 
Confederation, in contrast, acquired signatures over a long period of time—and 
only as states legally bound themselves to the document’s provisions. Although 
the stated date of the Articles’ signing is July 9, 1778 (and that in fact is the date 
on which representatives of eight states signed the document),27 
representatives from five states signed much later. Two of these states (North 
Carolina and Georgia) did not have delegates present in Philadelphia on July 
9th, and three others (Maryland, New Jersey, and Delaware) had not yet 
 
block under the heading “Assented to.” S.C. CONST. of 1778, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra 
note 24, at 3248-57. The 1778 constitution was actually an amended version of the state’s 
original 1776 constitution, which had been signed under the president/secretary model of 
Delaware, New Jersey, and North Carolina. S.C. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 6 THORPE, 
supra note 24, at 3241-48. 
The two remaining states, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, stand out because they 
were the only two states to provide for popular ratification of their constitutions. The 1780 
Constitution of Massachusetts displayed the signatures of the president and secretary, but 
these signatures were added prior to the document’s ratification. See JOURNAL OF THE 
CONVENTION FOR FRAMING A CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE STATE OF 
MASSACHUSETTS BAY (Boston, Dutton & Wentworth 1832). The president’s signature 
appears directly beneath the text of the constitution, and the secretary’s signature follows, 
introduced by the word “Attest.” MASS. CONST. of 1780, reprinted in THE POPULAR SOURCES 
OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY: DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780, at 
441-72 (1966) [hereinafter POPULAR SOURCES]. The New Hampshire constitution also 
displayed a president’s and a secretary’s signatures, but these signatures were added after 
ratification. N.H. CONST. of 1784, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 24, at 2453-70. 
26.  A total of forty-eight names appear below the final Article, far more than appeared on any 
state constitution then in existence, and slightly more than the forty that appeared on the 
Constitution itself. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 art. XIII, para. 4. Indeed, more 
members of the Second Continental Congress signed the Articles of Confederation than 
were typically present for the Congress’s daily business post-signing. See RICHARD B. 
MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 91-95 (1987) (discussing the low 
attendance in Philadelphia that followed the Articles’ signing). 
27.  See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 art. XIII, para. 3 (“Done at Philadelphia in the 
State of Pennsylvania the ninth day of July in the Year of our Lord One Thousand Seven 
Hundred and Seventy-Eight, and in the Third Year of the independence of America.”). 
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authorized their delegates to sign.28 As a result, these states’ delegates had to 
wait—for nearly three years in Maryland’s case—before finally affixing their 
names to the Articles.29 One need look no further than the document itself for 
evidence of its signatures’ gradual materialization. A total of nine different 
dates, ranging from July 9, 1778, to March 1, 1781, appear among the signers’ 
names. 
2. Semantic Differences 
Signatures can carry a variety of meanings. At one level, a signature might 
simply attest to facts. When, for example, a third party puts her name to a will, 
she merely bears witness to the will’s proper execution. A signature can also 
endorse ideas. When, for example, a citizen signs a petition, the signature does 
more than express agreement with facts contained in the instrument, it also 
evidences ideological support for the content of the instrument. Additionally, a 
signature can communicate legal authentication. When, for example, the U.S. 
President signs a piece of legislation, the signing act effects a transformation 
from bill to law.30 To future viewers of this legislation, the President’s 
signature does not necessarily indicate his support for the law, but it 
definitively establishes the legislation’s status as legally valid material. Finally, 
a signature can communicate a pledge to abide by certain obligations. The 
classic example is a signature on a written contract, which conveys a party’s 
pledge to discharge duties set forth in the instrument.31 
The meaning of the Constitution’s signatures contrasts with the meaning 
of both the state constitutions’ signatures and the Articles’ signatures. As to the 
state constitutions, it is important to observe that most state legislatures 
bypassed methods of popular ratification in promulgating their foundational 
 
28.  See EDMUND CODY BURNETT, THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 344 (1941). 
29.  Of Maryland’s recalcitrance, Burnett writes that “much grace would be required before she 
would cease to plague [Congress] or be persuaded to come in.” Id. at 345. 
30.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
31.  These categories are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. They are not mutually 
exclusive because it is entirely possible for a signature to communicate more than one of the 
meanings described above. A witness’s signature on a will, for example, can signal both an 
attestation to the will’s creation and the will’s legal authenticity, while a signature on a 
pamphlet might both attest to the signatory’s authorship of the pamphlet and endorse the 
pamphlet’s content. The categories are nonexhaustive, because certain types of signatures 
seem difficult to characterize as attesting, endorsing, authenticating, or pledging. Consider, 
for example, a celebrity’s autograph on a piece of memorabilia, which seems to convey 
something qualitatively different from any of these four meanings. 
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charters of government.32 Unlike the extraordinarily democratic and highly 
contentious process through which the federal Constitution became law, the 
state constitutions came into being through normal legislative processes 
marked by limited citizen involvement and little political fanfare.33 Only 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, the last two states to adopt constitutions 
before 1787, chose to solicit their citizens’ direct approval before implementing 
their foundational plans of government. The rest of the states considered their 
constitutions fully operative upon final legislative approval. For these states, 
the act of signing closely coincided—both as a functional and a temporal 
matter—with their constitutions’ transformation into law.34 
For this reason, the signatures appearing on the state constitutions can be 
construed as authenticating signatures—signatures that signaled the legal 
validity of the material that preceded them. With only one exception,35 
eighteenth-century state representatives signed their constitutions at a final 
rather than intermediate stage of formation. These signatures thus tracked the 
metamorphosis from bill to law, attaching the signatories’ names to legally 
operative provisions rather than legally inoperative proposals. Had these 
constitutions’ signers penned their names at an earlier stage, perhaps during a 
period of debate or even during the run-up to a final vote, their signatures 
 
32.  In New Jersey, New York, and Virginia, for example, preexisting legislative bodies enacted 
the proposed constitutions. The provincial congresses of Delaware, Maryland, and 
Pennsylvania did manage to provide for specially elected constitutional conventions, but 
even these conventions simply voted the proposed constitutions into law without 
submitting them to the people for ratification. North Carolina and Georgia took an 
intermediate route, assigning the drafting and adopting responsibilities to a regularly 
constituted congress, but holding elections for this congress immediately before it was to 
begin work on the state constitution. See ADAMS, supra note 24, at 68-93. A more democratic 
process of state constitution making occurred in Massachusetts. After nearly five years of 
attempted constitutions and failed ratifications, a newly elected constitutional convention 
drafted a constitution that was then ratified by the people. See POPULAR SOURCES, supra note 
25, at 22-25. In 1784, New Hampshire adopted a new constitution pursuant to a 
Massachusetts-like ratification model. See SUSAN E. MARSHALL, THE NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE 
CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 12 (2004). 
33.  See AMAR, supra note 3, at 9 (“In many states, sitting legislatures or closely analogous 
Revolutionary entities declared themselves solons and promulgated or revised constitutions 
on their own authority, sometimes without even waiting for new elections that might have 
given their constituents more say in the matter . . . .”). Amar does point out that “[t]hings 
began to change as the Revolution wore on,” as the later constitutional enactments in 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire showed a marked democratic improvement. Id. 
34.  This observation holds true for New Hampshire as well, since the New Hampshire 
Constitution was signed after it had been ratified. See supra note 25. 
35.  See supra note 25 (describing Massachusetts’s signatures). 
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would have lacked this authenticating dynamic. Instead, the signing act 
signified the existence of a legal relationship between these constitutions and 
their constituencies, in much the same way that the President’s signature 
signifies the existence of a legal relationship between a federal statute and the 
federal populace. 
The signatures on the Articles of Confederation also signified legal 
authenticity, as these signatures materialized at the final stage of the Articles’ 
legal transformation and thereby communicated the existence of active rather 
than potential provisions of law. But the Articles’ signatures also served as 
pledging signatures. As the text preceding the signatures made clear, the act of 
signing not only signaled the Articles’ status as law, but it also generated 
pledges to abide by that law: 
Know Ye, that we, the undersigned delegates, by virtue of the power 
and authority to us given for that purpose, do, by these presents, in the 
name and in behalf of our respective constituents, fully and entirely 
ratify and confirm each and every of the said articles of confederation 
and perpetual union, and all and singular the matters and things 
therein contained. And we do further solemnly plight and engage the faith of 
our respective constituents, that they shall abide by the determinations of the 
united States’ in congress assembled, on all questions which by the said 
confederation are submitted to them . . . .36 
By the Articles’ own terms, its signatures created both evidence of the 
document’s authenticity and promises to honor the charter by adhering to laws 
enacted pursuant to it. 
The Constitution’s signatures, on the other hand, signified neither legal 
authenticity nor pledges. The signers could not have authenticated the 
document’s status as law, because the Constitution did not become binding 
law until more than two years after its signing. As for pledging, nothing in the 
text preceding the Constitution’s signatures indicated that the signers had 
assumed obligations to abide by the Constitution in the event of its enactment, 
or even that they had assumed obligations to support the Constitution’s 
enactment.37 
 
36.  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781 art. XIII, para. 2 (emphasis added). 
37.  This is not to say that the Constitution’s signatures did not have a constraining effect on the 
signers. Indeed, as indicated by Section III.B. infra, the signatures’ existence did make it 
difficult for the signatories to oppose the Constitution during ratification. This constraining 
effect, however, did not result from obligations that the signatories had knowingly taken on 
by signing. Rather, it resulted from the fact that many eighteenth-century Americans 
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In short, had the Constitution’s signers—many of whom had been involved 
in the creation of the Articles and/or their respective state constitutions—
wished to follow in the tradition of these documents, they would not have 
signed their names to the document on September 17, 1787. Rather, they would 
have waited for the ratification process, during which representatives of the 
ratifying states could have affixed signatures connoting legal validity, and 
perhaps also pledges to abide by the Constitution.38 But the delegates at 
Philadelphia did not take this route, which indicates that their decision to sign 
was driven by something other than tradition-based impulses. 
i i .  the signatures’  ambiguity  
Given that the signatures did not signify authenticity or pledges to legal 
obligations, what did the delegates intend to express by signing the 
Constitution? The framework introduced above leaves us with two 
possibilities: attestations and endorsements. On the one hand, the delegates’ 
signatures can be characterized as attesting signatures—signatures conveying the 
signatories’ agreement with the fact that the Convention had duly promulgated 
the Constitution. Alternatively (or in addition), these signatures can be 
characterized as endorsing signatures—signatures conveying the signatories’ 
ideological support for the Constitution’s content. 
In this Part, I will show that considerable ambiguity surrounded the 
attesting/endorsing question, with interpretive divisions manifesting 
themselves both prior to and after the signing ceremony. Having presented this 
ambiguity, I will then seek to explain it. In particular, I will argue that this 
ambiguity was the product of choice rather than carelessness—designed to 
entice as many delegates as possible into adding their names to the 
Constitution. 
 
understood the signatures to reflect the signers’ endorsement of the Constitution, such that 
later attempts by the signers to oppose the Constitution would seem hypocritical and/or 
disingenuous. 
38.  This mode of signing could have taken one of two forms. First, state representatives might 
have signed the Constitution only after nine states had ratified, so as to authenticate the 
Constitution’s taking on legal life in accordance with its own terms. Second, state 
representatives might have signed as each state ratified, thus signaling the legal authenticity 
of each state’s decision to adopt the Constitution. 
COENEN_PRESS_V1.DOC 2/23/2010 10:20:30 PM 
the significance of signatures 
983 
 
A. Attesting Versus Endorsing: The Ambiguity Exposed 
1. The Attesting Interpretation 
The best evidence in support of an attesting interpretation of the 
Constitution’s signatures comes from the text of the Constitution itself. The 
so-called Attestation Clause contains the final piece of substantive language 
added to the document at the Constitutional Convention. It was proposed by 
Franklin, though his fellow Pennsylvanian Gouverneur Morris was responsible 
for its authorship.39 It reads: 
Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present 
the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one 
thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of 
the United States of America the Twelfth In witness whereof We have 
hereunto subscribed our Names . . . 40 
Taken at face value, the Attestation Clause suggests that the Constitution’s 
signatures do nothing more than attest. It begins by stating two facts about the 
Constitution—that it was “done” on September 17, 1787, and that it received 
the unanimous consent “of the States present”—and it then introduces the 
signers as witnesses to these facts. Additionally, the Attestation Clause makes 
no reference to endorsing; indeed, the conspicuous absence of endorsing terms 
might be interpreted to disclaim any intent to endorse. Madison reports that 
Gouverneur Morris saw the clause as attaching just such a limited meaning to 
the act of signing: “He remarked that the signing in the form proposed related 
only to the fact that the States present were unanimous.”41 
Franklin, who had introduced the Attestation Clause, offered some 
additional support for the notion that the signatures evidenced only agreement 
with the fact that the Convention had formally adopted the Constitution. In 
arguing for signature of the Constitution, he opined that “[i]t is too soon to 
pledge ourselves before Congress and our Constituents shall have approved the 
plan.”42 It is true that Franklin’s earlier speech had sounded endorsement-like 
 
39.  See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 643 (“This ambiguous form had been drawn up 
by Mr. G. M. in order to gain the dissenting members, and put into the hands of Docr. 
Franklin that it might have the better chance of success.”). 
40.  U.S. CONST. art. VII, para. 4. 
41.  2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 645. 
42.  Id. at 647. Franklin was responding to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney’s assertion that he 
planned to “sign the Constitution with a view to support it with all his influence, and 
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themes, by calling on delegates to “act heartily and unanimously in 
recommending this Constitution,” but here too Franklin created ambiguity by 
qualifying these words with the conditional “if approved by Congress & 
confirmed by the Conventions.”43 
The Attestation Clause’s timidity led directly to the signature of at least one 
delegate, William Blount of North Carolina. As recorded by Madison, “Mr[.] 
Blount said he had declared that he would not sign, so as to pledge himself in 
support of the plan, but he was relieved by the form proposed and would 
without committing himself attest the fact that the plan was the unanimous act 
of the States in Convention.”44 If Blount viewed his signature as merely an 
attestation, it is entirely possible that other delegates did so as well. 
Antifederalists, of course, favored an attesting interpretation, and they did 
their best to downplay the importance of the framers’ signatures. One citizen 
writing to the Pennsylvania Herald offered his own interpretation of the 
signatures as 
[s]urely not an approbation of the plan: But merely what a majority of 
the members had agreed to report to Congress. . . . Let not the advocates 
for despotism think themselves secure in carrying this high handed 
plan of power, because the respected names of Washington and 
Franklin appear as witnesses—perhaps unwilling witnesses, that it was 
agreed to by “the States present.”45 
This talking point appears to have gained some traction among the 
Constitution’s rank-and-file opponents. A Maryland citizen, for example, 
reported that “some have told me, that the General, Dr. Franklin, and some 
others, did only sign as witnesses, and that they had no hand in forming it.”46 
 
wished to pledge himself accordingly.” Id. The “pledging” discussed in this context should 
not be confused with the more formal sort of pledging reflected by the signatures on the 
Articles of Confederation. See supra text accompanying note 37. A more curious reference to 
pledges came from Elbridge Gerry, who stated that he “could not . . . by signing the 
Constitution pledge himself to abide by it at all events.” 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, 
at 647. No one else at Philadelphia seemed to share Gerry’s interpretation of the signatures, 
so I have not explored it in depth within this Section.  
43.  2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 643. 
44.  Id. at 646. 
45.  Letter to the Editor, PA. HERALD, & GEN. ADVERTISER, Oct. 27, 1787, at 334. This line of 
argument must have appealed to Antifederalists because it allowed them to minimize the 
importance of the Constitution’s signing without impugning the character of its signers. 
46.  Extract of a Letter from Queen Anne’s County (Maryland) to a Gentleman in Philadelphia, SALEM 
MERCURY, Dec. 4, 1787, at 3. 
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Such efforts to capitalize on the Attestation Clause’s weak wording did not go 
unanticipated at Philadelphia, where General Pinckney had cautioned that 
“[w]e are not likely to gain many converts by the ambiguity of the proposed 
form of signing.”47 
2. The Endorsing Interpretation 
One nevertheless gets the impression that signing meant something more 
than attesting, even to Franklin. The first section of his speech on September 17 
had everything to do with the actual merits of the Constitution. Words like 
“agree,” “consent,” and “support” run through its text, and it even goes so far 
as to characterize the Constitution as a “system approaching . . . near to 
perfection.”48 Common sense also suggests that, if Franklin understood the 
Constitution’s signatures as only attesting to the fact of the state delegations’ 
consent, he would not have gone to such great lengths to solicit individuals to 
sign. If the signing of the Constitution was meant to signal nothing more than 
attestation, there would have been little to argue about. No one disagreed 
about the fact that the states present had unanimously agreed to the document. 
While Franklin’s words may have sent mixed messages, other delegates 
more explicitly advocated an endorsing interpretation. Charles Cotesworth 
Pinckney, for example, criticized “the ambiguity of the proposed form of 
signing,” declaring that he would “sign the Constitution with a view to support 
it with all his influence, and wished to pledge himself accordingly.”49 Similarly, 
Jared Ingersol “did not consider the signing, either as a mere attestation of the 
fact, or as pledging the signers to support the Constitution at all events; but as 
a recommendation, of what, all things considered, was the most eligible.”50 
James McHenry also gave an endorsing interpretation to his own signature, 
stating that it was “clear that I ought to give [the Constitution] all the support 
in my power.”51  
 
47.  2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 647. 
48.  Id. at 642. 
49.  Id. at 647. 
50.  Id. 
51.  Id. at 650. Alexander Hamilton also embraced an endorsement interpretation. He explained 
his decision to sign by stating that the Constitution was better than nothing. “No man’s 
ideas were more remote from the plan than [Hamilton’s] own were known to be; but is it 
possible to deliberate between anarchy and Convulsion on one side, and the chance of good 
to be expected from the plan on the other.” Id. at 645-46. Hugh Williamson also equated 
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Also sharing this interpretation was Delaware delegate John Dickinson, 
who, absent from Philadelphia that day, had asked George Read to sign the 
Constitution on his behalf.52 Dickinson could not possibly have signed as an 
attesting witness, because he had not witnessed the final vote to which he 
would be attesting.53 Inclusion of his name can thus be read in only one way—
as approving of the Constitution, not as attesting to the mere fact of its 
adoption by the Convention. 
Consider also the delegates at Philadelphia who refused to sign. It was 
reported, for example, that “Mr. Randolph could not but regard the signing in 
the proposed form, as the same with signing the Constitution. The change of 
form therefore could make no difference with him.”54 Randolph’s sentiments 
on this point were echoed by his fellow nonsigner Elbridge Gerry, to whom 
“[t]he proposed form made no difference.”55 For these two (and presumably 
George Mason as well), signing the Constitution meant more than attesting to 
its approval no matter what the text above the signatures said. 
The Federalist press confirmed these suspicions. Pro-Constitution writers 
were quick to characterize the list of distinguished names on the document as 
proof of each delegate’s approval of the Constitution, and many took it for 
granted that the signatures communicated endorsements. A passage from the 
New Haven Gazette (originally printed in the Boston Gazette) is illustrative: 
[L]et every unprejudiced patriotic mind candidly determine—Whether 
it is possible to conceive that thirty-nine members out of forty-two, 
 
signing with endorsing. See id. at 645 (“For himself he did not think a better plan was to be 
expected and had no scruples against putting his name to it.”). 
52.  See Letter from John Dickinson to George Read (Sept. 15, 1787), reprinted in 3 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 81 (“Mr. Dickinson presents his compliments to Mr. Read, and 
requests that if the constitution, formed by the convention, is to be signed by the members 
of that body, Mr. Read will be so good as to subscribe Mr. Dickinson’s name—his 
indisposition and some particular circumstances requiring him to return home.”). A careful 
analysis of the handwriting, however, suggests it may have actually been Richard Bassett, 
Delaware’s other delegate, who added Dickinson’s name to the Constitution. See Michael E. 
Ruane, Why Constitution’s Signatures and Signers Don’t Add Up, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 19, 
1987, at 4B. 
53.  Professor Gordon Lloyd has concluded on the basis of Dickinson’s letter to Read and his 
billing receipts from Delaware that he was traveling home on September 15, the day the 
Convention voted to adopt the Constitution. See Gordon Lloyd, Sources for the Individual 
Delegate Attendance Record, http://teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/attendance/ 
sources.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).  
54.  2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 646. 
55.  Id. at 647. 
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which was the whole number the convention consisted of, would have 
affixed their signatures to a constitution by which themselves and 
posterity were to be governed in all generations, so essentially defective 
as [Elbridge Gerry] suggests?56 
More directly to the point, a Pennsylvania writer derided the notion (advanced 
earlier by an Antifederalist editorialist) that the delegates signed only as 
witnesses to the fact of the Constitution’s adoption: “If those whose names are 
subscribed to this instrument were only witnesses, who were the parties? Were 
not the subscribers appointed by the people for the express purpose of making 
this deed, and in what other form could they have shewn that they had 
accordingly made it?”57 Similarly, a Maryland publication responded to the 
Antifederalist claim that “Doctor Franklin was opposed to the constitution, and 
consented to sign it merely as a witness,” by quoting Franklin’s exhortation 
that the Convention “act heartily and unanimously in recommending this 
constitution wherever our influence may extend.”58 
B. Accounting for the Differences: The Ambiguity Explained 
How can we account for these divergent views of the signatures’ meaning? 
Why would the constitutional text support a limited attesting interpretation to 
its signatures, when so many of the delegates saw signing as also giving rise to 
endorsing? How do we reconcile, for example, Franklin’s warning that “it is 
too soon to pledge ourselves” with his (and his fellow Federalists’) aggressive 
solicitation of signatures?59 What are we to make of all these cross-cutting 
pieces of evidence? 
As illustrated by Franklin’s presigning reflections, he and his fellow 
Federalists were well aware that many of their colleagues harbored serious 
doubts about the merits of the Constitution. Indeed, the Constitutional 
 
56.  A Federalist, Letter to the Editor, NEW HAVEN GAZETTE & CONN. MAG., Nov. 22, 1787, at 315. 
57.  Letter to the Editor, PA. HERALD, & GEN. ADVERTISER, Nov. 10, 1787, at 2. 
58.  Antifederal Arguments, MD. J., Dec. 25, 1787, at 3,  reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 92, 92 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1983) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
59.  Barbara Oberg has noted that “[i]n the final manifestation of his great political genius—his 
last speech—his successful argument for compromise opened Franklin once again to the 
charge that he was a sly fox, intending more—or less—than he said and saying something 
other than what he meant.” Barbara B. Oberg, “Plain, Insinuating, Persuasive”: Benjamin 
Franklin’s Final Speech to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, in REAPPRAISING BENJAMIN 
FRANKLIN: A BICENTENNIAL PERSPECTIVE 175, 189 (J.A. Leo Lemay ed., 1993). 
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Convention had seen intense disagreement and disapproval throughout, and it 
is near certain that no delegate departed Philadelphia with the exact 
Constitution he had hoped for. At the same time, Franklin, Morris, and their 
fellow Federalists knew that a Constitution manifesting drafter disagreement 
would be at best embarrassing and at worst unratifiable. The challenge, then, 
was to make signing the Constitution a ritual that would placate fence-sitters 
and gung-ho supporters alike. 
Viewed in this light, the signatures’ ambiguity makes sense as the 
deliberate product of strategic political maneuvering. Hesitant delegates could 
take comfort in Franklin’s cautious words and the watered-down language of 
the Attestation Clause. Meanwhile, staunch Federalists could point to 
Franklin’s impassioned appeals for unanimous support as the primary reasons 
for penning their names. Different delegates could sign for different reasons, 
and to Franklin and other key supporters of the Constitution the reasons for 
signing mattered far less than the presence of signatures. 
i i i .  the signatures’  purpose  
The forgoing discussion demonstrates that (a) the decision to sign the 
Constitution was not an obvious one, and (b) Franklin and his allies took steps 
to maximize the number of names appearing beneath Article VII. These two 
observations suggest that many of the delegates at the Constitutional 
Convention strongly desired to include signatures on the Constitution. But 
why? 
The answer to this question, I believe, lies in the ratification process that 
followed in the Convention’s wake. Unlike the state constitutions, most of 
which were not ratified at all, and unlike the Articles of Confederation, which 
was ratified with little public participation, the Constitution would have to 
endure an epic struggle for approval by the people.60 From the Federalist Papers 
to the Letters from the Federal Farmer to thousands of other pamphlets, letters, 
and newspaper editorials circulated across the nation, arguments for and 
against the Federal Constitution would consume public attention throughout 
 
60.  See BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 199 (“As hard-fought as any battle of the Revolution, 
[ratification] was a contest of words and arguments and votes, of parades and bonfires, with 
an occasional riot thrown in for good measure.”). 
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the late 1780s.61 And in the end, the Constitution’s fate would turn on only a 
handful of votes in a handful of states.62 
The standard account of the Constitution’s signing places the event in the 
final chapter of the Philadelphia story.63 But there is an alternative account—
one that situates the signing in the first chapter of the ratification story. On this 
account, the signing of the Constitution makes sense not as an act looking back 
to the grueling efforts of the summer of 1787, but as an act looking forward to 
the upcoming fight for ratification. The signing, in other words, represented 
not so much a closing coda to the framers’ work, but rather the opening salvo 
of the ratifiers’ work—an act intended to generate and to maintain support for 
the document throughout the ratification process. 
This Part discusses two ways in which the signatures supported the 
Federalists’ efforts to secure the people’s approval for the Constitution. Section 
III.A. demonstrates that the signatures functioned as a marketing device, 
putting a favorable gloss on the Constitution and, in a subtle way, making a 
case for its ratification. Section III.B. demonstrates that the signatures also 
functioned as a constraining device, locking in the support of delegates who 
would carry influential weight at their own ratification conventions. 
A. The Signatures as a Marketing Device 
The signatures supported the ratification campaign by highlighting three 
pro-Constitution selling points: the unanimity of the Convention’s action, the 
prestige of the Convention’s participants, and the momentousness of the 
choice presented by the ratification process. 
 
61.  See generally THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: FOR AND AGAINST (J.R. Pole ed., 1987) 
(containing excerpts from the Federalist Papers and other pamphlets, articles, and speeches 
about the Constitution). 
62.  In Virginia and New York (two states indispensable to a consolidated federal union) the 
ratification votes were very close. Had a mere five of Virginia’s votes gone the other way, the 
Constitution would have been rejected. See ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE ORDEAL OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE ANTIFEDERALISTS AND THE RATIFICATION STRUGGLE OF 1787-1788, at 
250 (1966). Indeed, it took a Herculean effort on the part of James Madison and his whips 
to muster the votes needed to overcome entrenched Antifederalist opposition. See id. at 192-
98, 218-34. In New York, news of ratification from Virginia ultimately tipped the scale for 
the Federalists, thirty votes to twenty-seven. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT 
PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, 
at 305-06 (1966).  
63.  See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 184-91; BOWEN, supra note 62, at 254-64; CHARLES L. 
MEE, JR., THE GENIUS OF THE PEOPLE 280 (1987). 
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The Constitutional Convention was not a unanimous affair. To begin with, 
Rhode Island had so opposed the idea of the Convention that it never sent a 
delegation to Philadelphia. Some individual delegates did not attend for the 
same reason, and others abandoned the Convention’s efforts because they were 
fed up with the nationalizing direction of its work. By September 17, 1787, for 
example, Alexander Hamilton was the only remaining member of the New 
York delegation.64 Even among those who lasted until the end, serious 
disagreement persisted; three delegates refused to sign the Constitution, and 
some of the signers openly expressed conflicting feelings about the 
document.65 Nevertheless, the Attestation Clause states that the document was 
“[d]one in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present.”66 
How did the framers manage to characterize the Convention as 
unanimous? The answer turns on a close reading of the phrase “of the States 
present.” Voting at the Constitutional Convention took place on a state-by-
state basis, such that each state’s delegation registered only one “aye” or “nay” 
vote on behalf of its members. Individual delegates wishing to take a position 
on a motion before the Convention were thus forced to muster a majority of 
like-minded votes within their delegation. Indeed, Madison’s notes from the 
Convention recount only the state-by-state votes on each motion, so it is 
impossible for us to know from the vote tallies alone how close these votes 
were among the individuals present, or which delegates favored or disfavored a 
proposal at issue. The vote to “agree to the Constitution” was no different.67 
But what about Rhode Island and New York? These two states were, for 
the purposes of the Attestation Clause, treated as “not present” at the 
Constitutional Convention. In the case of Rhode Island, this characterization 
makes sense, as no one from the state ever showed up at Philadelphia. And, 
sure enough, no one from Rhode Island shows up among the Constitution’s 
signatories. 
 
64.  See 1 VILE, supra note 20, at 39-40. 
65.  See supra Section II.A. Although he ultimately signed the Constitution, James McHenry did 
not hide his doubts, characterizing himself as “opposed to many parts of the [constitutional] 
system” and only grudgingly accepting because “he distrust[ed] his own judgment.” 2 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 649. 
66.  U.S. CONST. art. VII, para. 2 (emphasis added); see also JOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ITS AMENDMENTS 119 (4th ed. 2006) (noting that the 
Constitution’s signatures “downplayed” the fact that “the delegates were not themselves 
unanimous”). 
67.  See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 633. 
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New York presents a more complicated picture. Unlike Rhode Island, the 
Empire State sent a three-person delegation to the Convention that remained 
present there for a substantial portion of the Convention’s duration. In fact, the 
New York delegation dissolved precisely because a majority of its members did 
not consent to the Convention’s plans.68 Even so, the Convention allowed New 
York’s remaining delegate, Alexander Hamilton, to sign the Constitution.69 In 
 
68.  Robert Yates and John Lansing, Jr., the two New York delegates to have left Philadelphia, 
explained their departure in a letter to the Governor: 
We were not present at the completion of the new constitution; but before 
we left the convention, its principles were so well established, as to convince us, 
that no alteration was to be expected, to conform it to our ideas of expediency and 
safety. A persuasion, that our further attendance would be fruitless and 
unavailing, rendered us less solicitous to return. 
3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 247. See generally BERNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 191-98 
(describing the “frustration and deadlock” within the New York delegation). It should be 
noted that had Hamilton’s co-delegates stuck around, they would have thwarted Federalist 
efforts to characterize the agreement at Philadelphia as “unanimous.” Indeed, this point 
holds for all Antifederalists who chose to abandon the Constitutional Convention rather 
than fight their battles within it. See Paul Finkelman, Turning Losers into Winners: What Can 
We Learn, if Anything, from the Antifederalists?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 849, 872 (2001) (reviewing 
SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION 
IN AMERICA, 1788-1828 (1999)) (“Had the antifederalists been a little shrewder, the 
document would have read something like this: ‘Endorsed by the votes of the state 
delegations, by a vote of ten aye and three nay.’”). 
69.  Interestingly, New York was the only state not to specify a quorum requirement within the 
credentials issued to its delegation. Compare Resolution, Feb. 28, 1787 (N.Y.) (no quorum 
requirement), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4, at 127, with An Act for 
Appointing Delegates to Meet in Convention of the States, May 10, 1787 (Conn.) (quorum 
requirement of one), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4, at 127; An Act Appointing 
Deputies from This State to the Convention Proposed To Be Held in the City of 
Philadelphia, Feb. 3, 1787 (Del.) (quorum requirement of three), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 4, at 130-31; An Ordinance for the Appointment of Deputies from This 
State, Feb. 10, 1787 (Ga.) (quorum requirement of two), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, 
supra note 4, at 137-38; An Act for the Appointment of, and Conferring Powers on, Deputies 
from This State to the Federal Convention, May 26, 1787 (Md.) (quorum requirement of 
one), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4, at 131; Resolution, Apr. 9, 1787 (Mass.) 
(quorum requirement of three), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4, at 126-27; An 
Act for Appointing Deputies from This State to the Convention, June 27, 1787 (N.H.) 
(quorum requirement of two), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4, at 126; 
Resolution, Nov. 23, 1786 (N.J.) (quorum requirement of three), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 4, at 128-29; Resolution, Feb. 24, 1787 (N.C.) (quorum requirement of 
three), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4, at 133-36; An Act Appointing Deputies 
to the Convention Intended To Be Held in the City of Philadelphia, Dec. 30, 1786 (Pa.) 
(quorum requirement of four), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4, at 129-30; 
Resolution, Apr. 10, 1787 (S.C.) (quorum requirement of two), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT’S 
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a sense, the framers were having it both ways, treating New York as “not 
present” for the purposes of determining state unanimity and “present” for the 
purpose of signing to such unanimity.70 In this way, the delegates implied the 
consent of twelve states when only eleven had actually consented.71 
It is not difficult to see why the framers would desire to communicate as 
much unanimity as possible. The greater the appearance of agreement at 
Philadelphia, the more seriously the people would take the framers’ proposal. 
The Constitution would have been easier to dismiss summarily if it had 
emerged from a conspicuously divided convention. Apparent unanimity, by 
contrast, endowed the document with credibility from the start of the 
ratification campaign and portended success down the road. Expressing 
optimism along these lines, the American Herald observed that “[t]he 
unanimity you have secured in your deliberations is an auspicious omen of our 
future concord and felicity.”72 
 
DEBATES, supra note 4, at 135-36; and An Act for Appointing Deputies from This 
Commonwealth to a Convention Proposed To Be Held in the City of Philadelphia, Oct. 16, 
1786 (Va.) (quorum requirement of three), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4, at 
132. As a result, Hamilton might have argued that, even with Yates and Lansing gone, his 
lone presence kept the New York delegation intact. The Convention records, however, do 
not indicate that Hamilton—or anyone else—ever tried to make such an argument. We can 
only speculate as to why, but one possible explanation is that Yates and Lansing had 
conditioned their departure on a promise from Hamilton not to vote on behalf of New York. 
I thank Seth Barrett Tillman for sharing this observation with me. 
70.  The framers made a similar move in their letter accompanying the Constitution, which 
included “Mr. Hamilton from New York” in its list of approving states. Letter from the 
Federal Convention to the Continental Congress (Sept. 17, 1787), reprinted in 2 FARRAND’S 
RECORDS, supra note 1, at 664-67. 
71.  Of course, the extent to which such an implication registered with the American people 
would have depended on their familiarity with the finer points of parliamentary procedure. 
If, that is, eighteenth-century Americans possessed a sophisticated knowledge of quorum 
requirements, bloc-by-bloc voting practices, and the distinction between supporting a 
motion and attesting to that motion’s support, then Hamilton’s lone signature on the 
Constitution may have been sufficient to tip them off to the New York delegation’s 
opposition to the Constitution. Cf. Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, 
Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. 
Chadha Was Wrongly Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1370 (2005) (arguing that modern-day 
“Americans have lost the ability to understand the political and parliamentary worlds as the 
Founders and ratifiers understood them”). 
72.  CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 729 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1993) 
(1928) (quoting Editorial, AM. HERALD (Boston), Sept. 30, 1787); see also THE FEDERALIST 
No. 37, at 198-99 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (“The real wonder is that 
so many difficulties [at the Convention] should have been surmounted, and surmounted 
with a unanimity almost as unprecedented as it must have been unexpected. It is impossible 
for any man of candor to reflect on this circumstance without partaking of the astonishment. 
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The Federalists’ push for unanimity manifested itself once more in 
Philadelphia a few weeks after the signing. The Second Continental Congress 
had received the freshly penned document and now faced the question whether 
to submit copies to the states for ratification. Though some members of 
Congress opposed the idea, the Federalists’ “parliamentary maneuvering” 
ultimately generated majoritarian support for the document within each state 
delegation.73 Thanks again to state-by-state voting, the Federalists once again 
secured a “unanimous” vote for their Constitution from a divided body. 
Pleased with this result, George Washington later confided to James Madison 
that “[t]his apparent unanimity will have its effect. Not every one has 
opportunities to peep behind the curtain; and . . . the appearance of unanimity 
in that body on this occasion will be of great importance.”74 One suspects that 
Washington felt the same way about the unanimity to which he had attested at 
the close of the Constitutional Convention. 
 2. Prestige 
The signatures highlighted a second matter of great importance to the 
ratifying public: the prestige of the body assembled at the Constitutional 
Convention. It was no secret that the states had sent A-list celebrities to 
Philadelphia—Thomas Jefferson once referred to the group as an “assembly of 
demigods”75—but it certainly did not hurt the chances of ratification to 
recapitulate the Convention’s distinguished roster on the face of its final 
product. Many ratifiers lacked the political expertise needed to make an 
informed judgment about the intricacies of the Constitution’s design; for 
them, ratification would be largely a question of trust. The delegates hoped to 
 
It is impossible for the man of pious reflection not to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty 
hand which has been so frequently and signally extended to our relief in the critical stages of 
the revolution.”). Meanwhile, the same Antifederalist who had drawn attention to the 
attesting nature of signatures, see text accompanying note 45 supra, also sought to pierce 
their veil of unanimity. See Letter to the Editor, supra note 45 (“[A]ll we know is that there 
were members enough from each state to give the vote of their state in favor of it. For it may 
not be totally useless to observe, that the plan itself does not say more, than that ‘the States 
present’ agreed to it.”) (emphasis in original). 
73.  See RUTLAND, supra note 62, at 18. 
74.  Letter from George Washington to James Madison (Oct. 10, 1787), quoted in RUTLAND, 
supra note 62, at 19. 
75.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Aug. 30, 1787), in 2 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON 
LETTERS 196 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1956) (“I have no doubt that all their other measures will 
be good & wise. [It] is really an assembly of demigods.”). 
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win this trust by drawing attention to the many prominent and popular 
statesmen involved in the Constitution’s creation.76 
Among the most prominent and popular of these statesmen were Benjamin 
Franklin and George Washington. Akhil Amar has argued that “[e]veryone at 
Philadelphia understood that Washington’s name alongside Franklin’s on the 
bottom of the proposed Constitution might be the key to ratification. If 
America’s most revered figures vouched for the new document, this fact alone 
might persuade doubters to give the experiment a try.”77 For those unsure 
about the Convention’s plan, the signatures of these two national heroes would 
have been a persuasive, if not a dispositive, indicator of the Constitution’s 
worth. As Charles Warren later made clear, “That many accepted the 
Constitution on the strength of Washington’s and Franklin’s signatures is 
undoubted.”78 
Taking the Convention’s cue, Federalist promoters of the Constitution 
were eager to draw attention to Washington and Franklin’s names. A widely 
circulated Federalist song, for example, featured the following lyrics: 
With gratitude let us acknowledge the worth, 
Of what the Convention has call’d into birth 
And the Continent wisely confirm what is done 
By Franklin the sage, and by brave Washington.79 
Another writer mused, “If [the names of] a WASHINGTON, a FRANKLIN, 
and other American patriots are still dear to [the people], we may venture to 
hope, that a speedy compliance with the recommendation of the late 
Convention will be the effect of their meeting . . . .”80 In the same vein, a 
correspondent doubted that 
 
76.  Taking note of just this fact, a letter to the New Hampshire Recorder marveled at “what 
CHARACTERS were employed in [the Constitution’s] construction, and finally sanctioned 
it by their signatures and recommendation.” Letter to the Editor, N.H. RECORDER, Feb. 26, 
1788, at 4. 
77.  AMAR, supra note 3, at 134-35. 
78.  WARREN, supra note 72, at 729 n.1. 
79.  The Grand Constitution: Or, The Palladium of Columbia: A New Federal Song, MASS. 
CENTINEL, Oct. 6, 1787, at 24, reprinted in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 58, at 344, 
345. 
80.  Editorial, N.H. SPY, Dec. 4, 1787, at 47; see also News, PROVIDENCE GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., 
Sept. 29, 1787, at 2 (“The concurrence of this venerable patriot [Franklin] in this 
Government, and his strong recommendation of it, cannot fail of recommending it to all his 
friends in Pennsylvania.”). 
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the gentlemen who [had] withheld their assent from the Federal 
Convention [were] superior to Washington or Franklin, either in 
abilities or patriotism—men whose names, born on the wings of fame, 
are known throughout the world—and whose merit is universally 
acknowledged.81 
Such arguments put opponents of the Constitution in a tricky position. For 
all practical purposes, Washington and Franklin were unimpeachable, and for 
those who warned against putting too much stock in their reputations, the 
backlash could be furious. One Antifederalist, for example, had urged 
Pennsylvanians to consider the Constitution “uninfluenced by the authority of 
names,” worrying of the “two illustrious personages” that “the unsuspecting 
goodness and zeal of the one, has been imposed on” and that the “weakness 
and indecision attendant on old age, has been practiced on in the other.”82 Yet 
even this note of caution drew a scathing rebuke: 
This defamer has even dared to let fly his shafts at a WASHINGTON, and 
a FRANKLIN, who, he tells you, have been so mean, ignorant and base, 
as to be dupes to the designs of the other members—Is not every man 
among you fired with resentment against the wretch who could 
undertake a jab thus low, infamous and vile? [A]nd who was so prone 
to slander, as wantonly to traduce names dear to every American; 
names, if not respected and esteemed, at least admired, even by their 
enemies.83 
 
81.  Editorial, N.H. RECORDER & WKLY. ADVERTISER, Dec. 4, 1787, at 2. 
82.  To the People of Pennsylvania, CARLISLE GAZETTE, Oct. 24, 1787, at 2. 
83.  To the People of Pennsylvania, MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, Nov. 6, 1787, at 1. Adopting a 
more neutral stance, Connecticut delegate Roger Sherman tried to refocus the debate on the 
merits of the Constitution itself: 
[O]ne party has seriously urged[] that we should adopt the New Constitution 
because it has been approved by Washington and Franklin: and the other . . . ha[s] 
urged that we should reject, as dangerous, every clause thereof, because that 
Washington is more used to command as a soldier, than to reason as a politician—
Franklin is old—others are young—and [James] Wilson is haughty. You are too well 
informed to decide by the opinion of others, and too independent to need a 
caution against undue influence. 
Roger Sherman, To the People of Connecticut, NEW HAVEN GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 1787, reprinted 
in FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION, WRITINGS OF THE “OTHER” FEDERALISTS 179, 179 
(Colleen A. Sheehan & Gary L. McDowell eds., 1998). 
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In the end, Washington’s signature probably mattered more than any 
other. Reporting from the Virginia ratifying convention, Federalist Charles 
Thruston acknowledged that things were close, but ultimately predicted that 
“the party in favour of the constitution must prevail; the signature and 
approbation of our great WASHINGTON, will give it a preponderancy to weigh 
down all opposition.”84 The signature, after all, hinted not only at 
Washington’s support for ratification, but also at his future political plans. 
This phenomenon did not go unnoticed by Gouverneur Morris, who 
referenced it in a letter to Washington himself: 
I have observed that your name to the new Constitution has been of 
infinite service. Indeed, I am convinced that if you had not attended the 
Convention, and the same paper had been handed out to the world, it 
would have met with a colder reception, with fewer and weaker 
advocates, and with more and more strenuous opponents. As it is, 
should the idea prevail that you will not accept the Presidency, it would 
prove fatal in many parts.85 
Put another way, by signing his name under Article VII, Washington had 
signed on to serve under Article II.86 And Washington’s likely service under 
Article II argued in favor of ratification. 
3. Momentousness 
The Constitution’s signatures also communicated to the people the 
extraordinary importance of the decision they had been called upon to make. 
Emphasis on momentousness figured prominently in Federalist rhetoric; 
indeed, it was this theme on which Publius began the Federalist Papers: 
It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to 
the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the 
important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not 
 
84.  Baltimore (Maryland) December 18, U.S. CHRON. (Providence, R.I.), Jan. 10, 1788, at 2. 
85.  Letter from Gouverneur Morris to George Washington (Oct. 30, 1787), reprinted in 
WARREN, supra note 72, at 730. 
86.  See AMAR, supra note 3, at 135 (“Every man at Philadelphia also understood, as did later 
ratifiers, that Washington would likely serve as America’s first President. What better way 
to remind fence-sitters of Washington’s place in the document’s past and future than to use 
the very label for the chief executive that everyone knew Washington had worn in the 
Convention itself?”). 
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of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether 
they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on 
accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at 
which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in 
which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we 
shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general 
misfortune of mankind.87 
Adopting Bruce Ackerman’s dualist terminology, we might say that the 
Constitution’s signatures helped communicate this moment of “constitutional” 
rather than “normal” politics.88 In particular, the signatures’ uniqueness would 
have reminded the ratifiers of the unusual responsibilities they faced and the 
special solidarity required to meet them. Those confronting the Constitution’s 
signatures would not even need to discern the signatories’ names to get the 
point. The penstrokes would by their numerosity alone convey the 
extraordinary political dynamics of the moment. 
The point is nicely illustrated by the state ratification conventions. Each of 
these conventions issued “ratification instruments,” documents that registered 
a convention’s assent to the Constitution. Of these ratification instruments, six 
out of thirteen contain an unusually large number of signatures. In particular, 
long lists of names appear on the ratification instruments of Georgia (26 
signatures), Delaware (30 signatures), New Jersey (39 signatures), 
Pennsylvania (47 signatures), Maryland (64 signatures), and Connecticut (129 
signatures).89 These six conventions thus departed from the traditional mode 
of signing that accompanied most government documents of the era (including 
 
87.  THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). 
88.  See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). Dualism, as Ackerman 
describes it, “seeks to distinguish between two different decisions that may be made in a 
democracy. The first is a decision by the American people; the second, by their 
government.” Id. at 6. 
89.  Of these states, Delaware, New Jersey, and Georgia displayed the names of convention 
delegates listed by county, 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4, at 319-21, 324, while 
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Maryland listed the names in no particular order, id. at 319-
22, 324-25. Of the remaining states, Massachusetts’s ratification instrument displayed the 
signatures of the president, vice president, and secretary from its convention, id. at 322-23; 
South Carolina, North Carolina, and Rhode Island the signatures of each convention’s 
president and secretary, id. at 325, 331-33, 334-37; Virginia the signature of its president only, 
id. at 327; and New York the signatures of its president and two secretaries, id. at 327-31. 
New Hampshire was the only state to include signatures of persons signing as convention 
officers and persons signing as state officers. Its ratification instrument displayed the 
signatures of the president and secretary of the convention, in addition to the president and 
the secretary of the state. Id. at 325-27. 
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the constitutions of their own states),90 and chose instead the irregular mode of 
signing reflected by the document they had ratified. We cannot know for sure 
what motivated this choice, but it seems possible that the unusual manner of 
signing was at least partially inspired by (and reflective of) the Constitution’s 
momentousness motif.91 
Momentousness was suggested not only by the differences between the 
Constitution’s signatures and those on less important documents, but also by 
evident connections between the Constitution’s signatures and those on the 
Declaration of Independence. The latter document had come into being just 
eleven years prior to the former, and, given its widespread popularity at that 
time, the Constitution’s proponents were eager to frame the ratification 
campaign as carrying forward the Revolution’s spirit. At the Virginia 
ratification convention, for example, George Wythe 
took a cursory view of the situation of the United States previous to the 
late war, their resistance to the oppression of Great Britain, and the 
glorious conclusion and issue of that arduous conflict. To perpetuate 
 
90.  See Section I.B. supra. Consider also the “credentials” issued by state officials to delegates 
sent to the Constitutional Convention, whose signatures were both few in number and 
unremarkable in form. See generally 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4, at 126-39 
(“Credentials of Members of the Federal Convention”). New Hampshire issued one 
credential signed by the Speaker of the House, President of the Senate, and a secretary. Id. at 
126. Massachusetts issued a credential signed by the Governor and a secretary. Id. at 127. 
Connecticut’s credential bore only the signature of a secretary. Id. New York’s credential 
was signed sequentially. At the top is a statement signed by Governor George Clinton that 
affirms a subsequently appended House Resolution signed by a clerk. Id. at 127-28. New 
Jersey issued three separate credentials at three different time periods. The first two of these 
were signed in 1786 and 1787 by then-Governor William Livingston and the third one was 
signed by vice president Robert L. Hooper. Id. at 128-29. (All three included the signature of 
a secretary as well.) Pennsylvania issued one credential signed by the Speaker of the House, 
the Clerk of the General Assembly, and the Master of the Rolls, and later issued a 
supplement to that credential (signed by the same three parties) adding Benjamin Franklin 
to the state’s delegation. Id. at 130. Maryland’s credential bore the signatures of two clerks 
and the Governor. Id. at 131. Each assembly in Virginia (the House of Delegates and the 
House of Senators) issued a credential (signed by legislative clerks) approving a slate of 
seven delegates; these credentials were subsequently amended by a proclamation (signed by 
Edmund Randolph) that replaced Patrick Henry with James McClurg. Id. at 132-33. North 
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia all issued individual letters of authorization to each 
of their delegates. These letters were signed by each state’s governor and by a secretary. Id. 
at 133-39.  
91.  Interestingly, these six states were among the first seven to ratify the Constitution. One 
highly speculative explanation of this correlation is that the earlier conventions to ratify were 
more enthusiastic about doing so and thus more inclined to mark the completion of their 
efforts with signing ceremonies. 
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the blessings of freedom, happiness, and independence, he 
demonstrated the necessity of a firm, indissoluble union of the states.92 
And at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson countered charges 
that the Constitution violated the Articles of Confederation by reading out loud 
the Declaration’s recognition of “the Right of the People to alter or abolish” 
ineffective governments.93 “This is the broad basis,” Wilson continued, “on 
which our independence was placed: on the same certain and solid foundation 
this system is erected.”94 Such allusions appeared in the popular press as well. 
The Federal Gazette, for example, argued that “[n]ot even the declaration of 
independence was of more magnitude” than the Constitution, “for by the 
establishment of this constitution only, can independence prove a blessing.”95 
Similarly, the United States Chronicle found it “agreeable . . . how many of the 
same events and circumstances concur in favour of the new federal 
government, that concurred in favour of the opposition of Great Britain and 
the declaration of independence in the beginning of the war.”96 By 1788, 
independence-laden rhetoric had become prevalent enough for George 
Washington to observe that “the spirit which at present agitates the nation has 
been in a great measure caught from the American revolution.”97 
In at least three respects, the Constitution’s signatures contributed to the 
Federalist’s efforts to highlight the document’s ties to the American 
Revolution. First, the Attestation Clause dated the signatures by reference to 
the “Year . . . of the Independence of the United States of America the twelfth,” 
 
92.  Debates from the Virginia Convention, in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 4, at 586. 
93.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
94.  Debates from the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 
4, at 457. For their own part, Antifederalists made sure to characterize the Constitution as 
incompatible with the Declaration’s guarantees. For an overview of the Declaration’s role in 
ratification debates, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
1776-1787, at 532-43 (1969). 
95.  Editorial, FED. GAZETTE, Nov. 26, 1788, at 2. 
96.  Editorial, U.S. CHRON., Apr. 17, 1788, at 2 (observing, among other things, that “[t]he same 
characters who took the lead in each of the States in the struggle for liberty in the glorious 
years 1775 and 1776, now take the lead in their exertions to establish the federal 
government”); see also Editorial, SALEM MERCURY, May 27, 1788, at 2 (arguing that 
ratification would promote “[t]he spirit of liberty . . . first excited by the translation and 
republication of the Farmer’s Letters, and since by the Declaration”). 
97.  Letter from George Washington to Edmund Randolph (Oct. 17, 1788), in 5 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 4, at 575. 
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thereby making an implicit reference to the events of July 4th, 1776.98 Second, 
as mentioned above, many of the signatures belonged to heroes from the 
American Revolution.99 Six of the Constitution’s signatories—Benjamin 
Franklin, James Wilson, George Clymer, Robert Morris, George Read, and 
Roger Sherman—had just eleven years earlier signed the Declaration, and 
many more (including, for example, Washington and Hamilton) had made 
important military contributions to the War for Independence. Finally, the 
sheer number of signatures that appeared on the Constitution would have 
reminded ratifiers of the Declaration, one of the few well-known national 
documents to display a comparably large number of names.100 By creating 
these connections, the signatures on the Constitution may have helped link the 
current struggle for unity to the past struggle for separation. Although 
Antifederalists argued that the Constitution broke with the spirit of ’76,101 
Federalists could rely on the Constitution’s signatures as visual cues to suggest 
continuity with the Revolutionary cause. 
 
98.  See U.S. CONST. art. VII, para. 2 (“Done in Convention . . . in the Year . . . of the 
Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth . . . .”). 
99.  Cf. supra Subsection III.A.2. (discussing the collective prestige of the Constitution’s 
signers). 
100.  Indeed, the Declaration itself had broken with tradition in displaying such a large number of 
signatures. See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE 151 (1997) (noting that “[t]he Second Continental Congress signed its ‘Olive 
Branch Petition’ to the King but no other document previous to the Declaration of 
Independence”); LOIS G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 13 (1981) (“Of 
documents comparable to the [English] Declaration of Rights, only the Declaration of 
Independence of the American colonies was signed by its framers.”). 
101.  As one Antifederalist argued: 
Who is he so base, that will peaceably submit to a government that will eventually 
destroy his sacred rights and privileges? The liberty of conscience, the liberty of the 
press, and the liberty of trial by jury, &c, must lie at the mercy of a few despots—
an infernal junto, that are for changing our free republican government into a 
tyrannical and absolute monarchy. These are what roused the sons of America to 
oppose Britain, and from the nature of things, they must have a similar effect 
now. 
Philadelphiensis, For the Freeman’s Journal, FREEMAN’S J., Jan. 23, 1788, at 3; see also Alfred, 
Letter to the Editor, MASS. GAZETTE, Oct. 28, 1788 at 1 (“The privilege of trial by jury, in 
civil cases, is so solemnly thought of in the declaration of independence . . . that one might 
have expected to have found it in a new frame of government—But it is not there.”). 
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B. The Signatures as a Constraining Device 
A second way that the signatures promoted the ratification campaign was 
by locking in the signatories’ support for the Constitution. As was well 
understood by the Federalists, the Constitution’s chances depended in part on 
the backing of politically influential figures within each state—many of whom 
had been present at the Constitutional Convention and had immersed 
themselves in the Convention’s work. Understandably, the Constitution’s most 
ardent supporters did not relish the thought of tentative supporters at 
Philadelphia returning home and, sensing murmurings of popular discontent, 
changing their allegiances. 
The risk of flip-flopping was heightened because the Convention’s 
proceedings had been, and would continue to be, a clandestine affair. Much to 
the chagrin of many,102 the Convention’s meetings had taken place behind 
closed doors, and its official records would be stowed away until 1818.103 As a 
result, little more than word of mouth could prevent delegates who had voted 
in favor of the Constitution or its key component parts to claim later that they 
had never done so. 
To guard against this risk, the Constitution’s supporters turned to a record 
of their proceedings that would soon become publicly available: the 
Constitution itself. Signatures on the Constitution would link the delegates to 
the document, name-by-name and state-by-state, for all the world to see. As 
suggested earlier,104 not everyone regarded the signatures as endorsements of 
the Constitution, but this interpretation prevailed among many, thereby 
constraining the ability of yes-voters at Philadelphia to become naysayers back 
home. To be sure, the Constitution’s signers never formally pledged to endorse 
the document during ratification. Nonetheless, by putting their names on the 
document itself, they made it difficult to distance themselves from the 
document without appearing to be hypocrites. 
 
102.  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, supra note 75 (“I am sorry they began 
their deliberations by so abominable a precedent as that of tying up the tongues of their 
members. Nothing can justify this example but the innocence of their intentions, & 
ignorance of the value of public discussions.”). 
103.  The Convention had early on adopted the rule that “nothing spoken in the House be 
printed, or otherwise published, or communicated without leave.” 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 1, at 15. See generally 2 VILE, supra note 20, at 692-96 (discussing the secretary of 
the Convention’s records and the eventual disclosure of the Convention’s official records in 
1818).  
104.  See supra Part II. 
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Again, we can analogize to the signatures on the Declaration of 
Independence. In particular, the Declaration’s signatures were introduced by 
the following passage: “And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm 
reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each 
other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.”105 This reference to 
“Lives” was a literal one; by putting their names to the Declaration—what 
Pauline Maier has described as “a public confession of treason”106—John 
Hancock and his colleagues in practical effect signed their own “wanted” 
posters. Their signatures, that is, made permanent and public the signatories’ 
repudiation of King George; for these individuals, there was no turning back 
once name was put to paper. An unsigned Declaration might have allowed a 
delegate to deny his involvement in the venture if things turned out badly; the 
Declaration, however, would accommodate no such jumping off the 
bandwagon. 
A similar, albeit less explicit, form of constraining was effected by the 
Constitution’s signing. When Virginia delegate Edmund Randolph announced 
his decision to withhold his name from the Constitution, Franklin responded 
that he “hoped that [Randolph] would yet lay aside his objections, and, by 
concurring with his brethren, prevent the great mischief which the refusal of 
his name might produce.”107 This “great mischief” Franklin had described 
earlier in his speech: 
If every one of us in returning to our Constituents were to report the 
objections he has had to [the Constitution] . . . we might prevent its 
being generally received, and thereby lose all the salutary effects & great 
advantages resulting naturally in our favor among foreign Nations as 
well as among ourselves, from our real or apparent unanimity.108 
 
105.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776). To be sure, the Constitution’s 
signatures are distinguishable from the Declaration’s signatures in that only the latter 
expressed a formal pledge of support. My point here is only that both sets of signatures 
locked in the support of the signers by making that support highly visible. 
106.  MAIER, supra note 100, at 152. 
107.  2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 646. Alexander Hamilton echoed similar concerns. 
Madison’s notes have Hamilton worrying that “[a] few characters of consequence, by 
opposing or even refusing to sign the Constitution, might do infinite mischief by kindling the 
latent sparks which lurk under an enthusiasm in favor of the Convention which may soon 
subside.” Id. at 645 (emphasis added). 
108.  Id. at 643. In May of 1788, Charles Pinckney openly worried that some of Franklin’s worst 
fears were coming to light. In a response to Luther Martin’s widely published negative 
exposé on the Constitutional Convention, Pinckney wrote: 
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At a time when the prospects of ratification remained uncertain, Franklin’s 
apprehensions were not insignificant, and he certainly had good reason to 
discourage his colleagues from becoming turncoats. The signatures represented 
one way of doing so. Just as the signatories to the Declaration had all but 
assured the futility of later attempts to disavow their revolutionary act, so too 
would the Constitution’s signers effectively preclude themselves from later 
repudiating the document. 
It was just this element of the signing that caused Randolph not to put his 
name to the Constitution. In declining to sign, Randolph assured his fellow 
delegates that “he did not mean by this refusal to decide that he should oppose 
the Constitution without doors. He meant only to keep himself free to be 
governed by his duty as it should be prescribed by his future judgment.”109 In 
other words, Randolph would keep quiet for now, but he could make no 
promises about the future. And his ability to “keep himself free” would depend 
on leaving behind no paper trail. As Randolph later wrote, 
A constitution ought to have the hearts of the people on its side. But if, 
at a future day, it should become burdensome after having been 
adopted in the whole, and they should insinuate that it was in some 
measure forced upon them, by being confined to the single alternative 
of taking or rejecting it altogether,—under my impressions, and with 
my opinions, I should not be able to justify myself, had I signed.110 
Randolph’s refusal to sign thus exhibited the very sort of behavior Franklin 
was hoping to prevent. Had every delegate taken Randolph’s wait and see 
 
What pity the salutary caution of Doct. Franklin, just previous to his signing the 
constitution recommended by the convention, had not been strictly attended to! 
If we split, it will in all probability happen in running headlong on the dangerous 
rock he so prophetically (as it were) warded us from, “That the opinions of the 
errors of the constitution born within the walls of the convention, should die 
there, and not a syllable be whispered abroad.” This Hint is full of that foresight 
and penetration the Doctor has always been remarkable for. 
Charles Pinckney, Letter to the Editor, STATE GAZETTE OF S.C., May 2, 1788, reprinted in 3 
FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 300-01. 
109.  2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 645; see also Letter from Edmund Randolph to 
Beverly Randolph (Sept. 18 1787), reprinted in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 83 
(“Altho’ the names of Colo. Mason and myself are not subscribed, it is not, therefore, to be 
concluded that we are opposed to its adoption. Our reasons for not subscribing will be 
better explained at large, and on a personal interview, than by letter.”). 
110.  A Letter of His Excellency Edmund Randolph, Esq., On the Federal Constitution, to the 
Honorable Speaker of the House of Delegates, Va. (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 1 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES, supra note 4, at 489-90. 
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approach, the Constitution might have lost support among key leaders. But by 
linking the delegates to the document, the signatures tended to prevent their 
creators from abandoning the Constitution down the road. In this sense, the 
signatures not only communicated the signers’ present-day support for the 
Constitution; they also ensured that this present-day support would not turn 
into future opposition. 
iv.  the signatures in modern constitutional debate 
The preceding discussion has focused on history, offering observations 
about the motives and understandings of persons from a time long past. But, 
as is often the case with historical inquiries, the story of the signatures’ past can 
inform inquiries of the present. Along these lines, this Part explores the 
signatures’ influence on some modern-day debates about the Constitution’s 
meaning. In particular, it will explore three ways in which the signatures might 
(or might not) affect our understanding of the twenty-first century 
Constitution. The first relates to federalism, the second relates to the 
Declaration of Independence, and the third relates to the idea of constitutional 
authorship. 
A. Federalism 
Some commentators have cited the signatures in support of claims about 
the relationship between the federal government and the states. The 
signatures, these scholars argue, evidence an understanding on the part of the 
framers that the new national union would reserve ample room for state 
sovereignty.111 By signing the Constitution on a state-by-state basis, and by 
emphasizing the consent of the “states present,” the framers (so this argument 
goes) signaled that the states would continue to constitute powerful 
independent units within the new federal regime. This is in essence a variant of 
the argument—most prominently associated with Justice Thomas’s dissent in 
U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton—that Article VII’s call for state-by-state 
 
111.  Raoul Berger, Interstate Commerce: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 74 TEX. L. REV. 785, 787 
(1996); see also City of Atlanta v. Stokes, 165 S.E. 270, 279 (Ga. 1932) (Gilbert, J., dissenting) 
(citing “[t]he last and concluding words of that great document” to support a claim that the 
states possessed a concurrent taxing power); cf. Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: 
The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1113, 1150 (2001) (noting that the Attestation 
Clause “might signify retained sovereignty, but it might also signify . . . that the states had 
submitted themselves in the plan of the Convention to federal supremacy”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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ratification limited the extent to which the new union’s national character 
absorbed the old union’s federalist character.112 
Whatever the merits of Justice Thomas’s claims about Article VII, parallel 
claims about the Constitution’s signing face two problems. First, recall that 
voting throughout the Constitutional Convention occurred on a state-by-state 
basis; thus, the Attestation Clause’s reference to “states” reflects a procedural 
rule used throughout deliberations at Philadelphia.113 Given that the delegates 
adopted this procedural rule before they began work on the Constitution itself, 
the rule is minimally probative of points related to constitutional design. One 
might argue in response that the delegates’ decision to adopt this procedural 
rule was borne out of the same commitment to state sovereignty that later 
worked its way into the framers’ constitutional plan. But this argument, too, 
carries little persuasive weight. The Constitutional Convention, after all, met at 
a time when the Articles of Confederation were still in effect, so state-by-state 
voting was just as likely to evidence an understanding about federalism under 
the Confederation regime as it was about federalism under the future 
constitutional regime. 
Second, as we have already seen, state-by-state signing enabled the 
delegates at Philadelphia to package the Constitution as an object of 
unanimous agreement and, in particular, to gloss over the uncomfortable fact 
that a majority of the appointed members of the New York delegation opposed 
the document. Given this practical motive for incorporating the states into the 
signatures, it is unlikely that the form of signing arose solely out of conceptual 
understandings about federalism within the new union. 
These observations, of course, do not disprove the claim that the framers 
intended to create a sharply circumscribed national government. They do, 
however, cast doubt on any attempt to characterize the signatures as indicative 
of such an intention. 
B. Revolutionary Ties 
Another use of the signatures in contemporary debate cites them as 
evidence of the Constitution’s close connection to the Declaration of 
 
112.  514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The ultimate source of the 
Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the 
consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole. The ratification procedure 
erected by Article VII makes this point clear.”). 
113.  1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 1, at 10-11 (explaining the delegates’ decision to adopt a 
state-by-state voting rule). 
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Independence. Proponents of this argument focus in large measure on the 
signatures’ date—in particular, the Attestation Clause’s reference to “the Year 
. . . of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth.”114 This 
language, commentators have argued, indicates that the Constitution, and the 
new government to serve under it, marked a continuation of, rather than 
deviation from, the ideals that animated the nation’s revolutionary struggle.115 
It confirms, in other words, that the Constitution “is but the body and the 
letter of which the [Declaration of Independence] is the thought and the spirit, 
and [that] it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of 
the Declaration of Independence.”116 
My analysis supports this interpretation of the signatures. Indeed, as I have 
shown above, the signatures represented only part of a broader attempt by pro-
Constitution forces to link the Constitution’s ratification campaign to the 
country’s recently completed independence campaign.117 Given these 
widespread efforts to link the Declaration and Constitution throughout 
ratification, one can infer from the signatures’ date not just the framers’ 
understanding that the Constitution would carry forward the Declaration’s 
spirit, but also the ratifiers’ insistence on assurances to that effect. Put another 
way, the signatures remind us that late eighteenth-century America still held its 
Revolutionary efforts in high esteem and thus saw in the Constitution’s “more 
perfect union” a better way to put the Declaration’s principles into practice. To 
the extent, then, that courts and commentators have attempted to incorporate 
these ideas into constitutional arguments,118 the signatures lend some measure 
of validation to their claims.119 
 
114.  U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
115.  See, e.g., David Barton, The Image and the Reality: Thomas Jefferson and the First Amendment, 
17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 399, 451 (2003) (citing the signatures as 
“[a]dditional evidence that the two documents are interconnected and inseparable”); 
Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 65 (1989) (“If the Constitution is not 
a logical extension of the principles of the Declaration of Independence, important parts of 
the Constitution are inexplicable. One should never lose sight of the fact that the last words 
of the original Constitution as written refer to the Declaration of Independence, written just 
eleven years earlier.”). 
116.  Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160 (1897); see also HARRY V. JAFFA, 
ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION, A DISPUTED QUESTION 394 
(1994) (arguing that “the principles of the Declaration of Independence are the principles of 
the Constitution”). 
117.  See supra Section III.A.3. 
118.  See Charles H. Cosgrove, The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation: A 
Selective History and Analysis, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 107, 109-17 (1998) (reviewing appeals to 
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C. Constitutional Authorship 
We have seen that the Constitution’s signing conflicted to some extent 
with Article VII, Article V, and the Preamble, all of which vested the power of 
constitutional authorship in the people at large, not in the elite cadre of men 
who drafted the document at Philadelphia. The signatures may in this way 
have muted the Constitution’s populist overtones, by drawing undue attention 
to the “assembly of demigods” that—according to the Constitution itself—
possessed no powers either to bring the Constitution into effect or to make 
subsequent amendments to it. 
 
the Declaration of Independence in Supreme Court opinions); Lee J. Strang, Originalism, 
The Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A Unique Role in Constitutional 
Interpretation?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 413, 415-31 (2006) (reviewing appeals to the Declaration 
made by members of the abolitionist movement, the women’s suffrage movement, the civil 
rights movement, and the pro-life movement); id. at 432-37 (reviewing scholarly arguments 
about the Declaration’s role in modern constitutional debate). 
119.  The Attestation Clause’s dating of the Constitution has given rise to another interpretive 
claim—namely, that the Clause’s reference to the “Year of our Lord” evidences an early lack 
of shyness about incorporating explicit religious references into public language. The most 
noteworthy instance of this claim comes from the U.S. Congress, which, in response to a 
Ninth Circuit decision on the Pledge of Allegiance, Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 
(9th Cir. 2002), resolved that: 
The erroneous rationale of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Newdow would 
lead to the absurd result that the Constitution’s use of the express religious 
reference “Year of our Lord” in Article VII violates the First Amendment to the 
Constitution, and that, therefore, a school district’s policy and practice of teacher-
led voluntary recitations of the Constitution itself would be unconstitutional. 
Act of Nov. 13, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-293, § 1(16), 116 Stat. 2057, 2060; see also Am. Jewish 
Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) 
(“From the beginning of the Republic much of the federal government’s symbology has 
been Christian—down to the dating of the Constitution itself . . . .”); Barton, supra note 115, 
at 453 (2003) (“The use of the phrase ‘in the year of our Lord’—acknowledging the 
reckoning of time based on the birth, life, and death of Jesus Christ—is a specific recognition 
of Christianity.”). 
My account of the signatures offers no significant contribution to this debate. That 
said, I cannot resist identifying an obvious problem with the reductio ad absurdum logic of 
the congressional resolution: the signing of the Constitution took place more than four 
years before ratification of the First Amendment. Thus, to claim that the Attestation Clause 
“violates” the First Amendment is simply to claim that the First Amendment supersedes the 
Attestation Clause. Any proven inconsistency, then, between these two pieces of the 
Constitution would be no more “absurd” than the clear inconsistency between, say, the 
Three-Fifths Clause and the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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There is some reason to worry that this sort of undue attention persists 
within our modern-day constitutional discourse. Consider the following three 
examples: 
First, by law, the United States celebrates “Constitution Day” on the 
anniversary of the Constitution’s signing rather than on the anniversary 
of its ratification.120 To commemorate this holiday, the National 
Constitution Center runs an exhibit in which visitors to the museum 
sign a giant replica of the Constitution surrounded by life-size statues 
of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention.121 
Second, as Barry Friedman has demonstrated, certain strands of 
originalist thought reveal a “relative lack of attention to understandings 
of the Civil War Amendments.”122 Professor Friedman has voiced 
concerns about this inattention to the nation’s “Second Founding,” 
observing that “[a]s a nation and a constitutional culture, we wallow 
deep in the waters of the Founding era,” but that “the rich history of 
the Civil War Amendments has barely been integrated into our national 
ethos.”123 Akhil Amar has advanced similar arguments, characterizing 
our constitutional narratives as “Founding-obsessed” and under-
appreciative of the Reconstruction Amendments’ place “at the center, 
rather than the periphery, of the unfolding American epic.”124 
 
 
120.  See 36 U.S.C. § 106(b) (2006) (“Constitution Day . . . commemorate[s] the formation and 
signing on September 17, 1787, of the Constitution . . . .”); see also Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2005, § 111(b), 118 Stat. 3344 (2004) (“Each educational institution 
that receives Federal funds for a fiscal year shall hold an educational program on the United 
States Constitution on September 17 of such year for the students served by the educational 
institution.”). 
121.  National Constitution Center, Constitution Day, At the Center, 
http://www.constitutioncenter.org/ncc_progs_At_the_Center.aspx (last visited Dec. 7, 
2009). 
122.  Barry Friedman, Reconstructing Reconstruction: Some Problems for Originalists (And Everyone 
Else, Too), 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1201, 1208 (2009). 
123.  Id. at 1205. 
124.  Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV. 145, 190 
(2008); see also Tom Donnelly, Our Forgotten Founders: Reconstruction, Public Education, and 
Constitutional Heroism, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (“For generations, our 
leading high school textbooks have praised the Founding generation and canonized certain 
‘Founding Fathers,’ while, at the same time, largely ignoring Reconstruction’s key players 
and underemphasizing the constitutional revolution our Forgotten Founders envisioned 
(and began to wage).”). 
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Third, in a 2009 op-ed entitled “Sen. Feingold’s Constitution,” 
Washington Post columnist George Will criticized both the Seventeenth 
Amendment and a proposed amendment to the Constitution that 
would require states to fill vacant Senate seats through special elections. 
In particular, Will worried that this proposed amendment would repeat 
the Seventeenth Amendment’s error of “nudg[ing] the Senate still 
further away from the nature and function the Framers favored.”125 
Each of these examples highlights a tendency within our constitutional 
culture to overvalue the framers’ role (and to undervalue our own role) in 
writing the American constitutional story. By celebrating Constitution Day on 
September 17, we give short shrift to the extraordinary process in which 
thousands of Americans discussed, debated, and decided the question whether 
to ratify the Constitution. In similar fashion, by downplaying the 
transformative significance of the Reconstruction Amendments, we perpetuate 
a myth that America’s constitutional past (and, for that matter, its 
constitutional future) has room for only one Founding Moment and only one 
set of Founding Fathers. And, finally, by condemning both actual and 
proposed constitutional amendments for eschewing plans the “framers 
favored,” we promote a blind faith in the constitutional innovations of the 
framers, while denying the possibility that We the People of the present might 
be able to make worthwhile innovations of our own. 
To be clear, I do not intend to suggest that the signatures are responsible 
for contemporary Americans’ failure to take ownership of their Constitution, or 
even that such a failure is particularly widespread or severe. But I do wonder 
whether, to the casual observer at least, the signatures contribute to a 
constitutional consciousness that is framer-heavy and people-lite—one that 
treats the Constitution as law that the framers imposed on us, rather than law 
that our society has imposed, and continues to impose, on itself. 
On further reflection, however, we need not view the signatures in this 
way. The critical point, which is developed in detail above, is that the 
signatures served most powerfully as a means to the end of popular ratification. 
Understood in this way, the signatures reflect not the special preeminence of 
the Constitution’s drafters, but rather the special work that these drafters (and 
many others) undertook to convince the American public to become the 
Constitution’s ultimate authors. The signatures, in other words, do not reveal 
some special sense of constitutional ownership by those who put their hands to 
the Constitution. To the contrary, these signatures reveal the signers’ 
 
125.  George F. Will, Sen. Feingold’s Constitution, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2009, at A19. 
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understanding that the Constitution belongs to the American people as a 
whole—beginning with those who would participate in the intensely 
democratic ratification process initiated by the signers themselves. Thus, when 
future constitutional actors propose future constitutional changes, we should 
judge their proposals not from the perspective of those persons with names on 
the Constitution, but from the perspective of those persons at whom these 
names are directed—namely, ourselves. 
conclusion 
I hope that this Note has conveyed at least three important points about the 
Constitution’s signatures. First, as indicated both by Hugh Williamson’s 
proposal and by other important founding documents of the era, the framers’ 
decision to sign the Constitution was neither obvious nor automatic. Indeed, 
we can at least say that there were some plausible arguments to be made 
against signing the Constitution and that these arguments merited careful 
consideration. Second, as indicated by Part II, the meaning of the signatures 
was, from their inception, never clear, and their lack of clarity resulted not 
from sloppy draftsmanship, but from the political ingenuity of Benjamin 
Franklin and his fellow Federalists. Finally, as indicated by Part III, the 
Constitution’s signatures proved a boon to the ratification effort. They did not, 
of course, single-handedly tip the scale in favor of ratification, but, as both a 
marketing device and as a constraining device, the signatures contributed to 
the Federalists’ efforts to secure popular approval for the Constitution. 
But most of all, I hope this Note has suggested that the Constitution’s 
signatures, as formulaic as they may seem, are in fact the narrators of a rich 
piece of constitutional history. Once key contributors to the Constitution’s 
ratification campaign, the signatures today contribute to our understanding of 
both the Constitution itself and the remarkable process through which it 
became the supreme law of the land. 
